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Introduction 
 
Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in 
the long history of the free will debate.  To my knowledge, Kant commentators have not yet 
explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that 
will be my goal here.  By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally 
responsible for our actions.  Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the 
attribution of moral responsibility as "imputation".   By "Kant's theory of freedom", I mean not 
only his theory of transcendental freedom and imputation, but also the various ways in which he 
draws on these ideas in his moral theory. 
The key commitment of asymmetry theorists is that the standards that must be met to 
count agents as free and morally responsible are different in the context of the positive reactive 
attitudes and their attendant practices, such as praise and reward (what I will call "positive 
imputation" in Kant's context) than they are in the context of the negative reactive attitudes and 
practices including blame and punishment ("negative imputation" in Kant's context).  The most-
discussed asymmetry theory, developed by Susan Wolf and Dana Nelkin, posits an ontological 
asymmetry: people can be blameworthy only if they had alternative possibilities, but can be 
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praiseworthy even if they did not have alternative possibilities.
1
  I have argued that even if we do 
not posit such an ontological asymmetry, we should acknowledge an epistemic and justificatory 
asymmetry—even if the ontological requirement agents must satisfy to be blameworthy is the 
same as the one they must satisfy to be praiseworthy, we must have better reasons for believing 
that the ontological requirement is satisfied to legitimately treat agents as morally responsible in 
the context of the negative reactive attitudes than we must have in the context of the positive 
reactive attitudes.  This is because it is intuitive to think that people deserve the benefit of the 
doubt, and that there is a hazard of injustice in getting things wrong in connection with blame 
which does not exist in connection with praise, or at least does not exist in the same way or to the 
same degree.
2
   
I will not propose a reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom that posits an ontological 
asymmetry.  I do not think this would be would be very useful, given Kant’s consistency about 
the ontology of transcendental freedom.  But given the dramatic shifts in Kant's epistemology of 
transcendental freedom and the inconsistencies they inflict upon commentators, I think a 
reconstruction which posits a justificatory asymmetry should be of interest. The reconstruction I 
want to propose is meant to be revisionary: I think that while Kant got a great deal right about 
the building blocks of his theory of freedom, he never fits them together in a stable way in his 
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own texts.  So this reconstruction does not describe the theory of freedom I think he actually held 
himself, but rather the one I think he ought to have held, and one which can be defended in 
contemporary discussions about free will. 
Kant's understanding of the ontology of transcendental freedom seems consistent 
throughout the critical philosophy.  It is a species of agent-causation which we might gloss as 
"noumenal libertarianism": it affords alternative possibilities of action despite phenomenal 
determinism, which Kant thinks we must posit in the contexts of both positive and negative 
imputation.
3
  While there may in principle be conceptual space to explore a reconstruction on 
which transcendental freedom is only necessary in the context of negative imputation, I will not 
explore that possibility here, both because it would alter a consistent feature of Kant's 
metaphysics, and also because I think that Kant is largely correct in his doctrine of 
transcendental freedom.  I think that we would need a power much like this to satisfy the control 
requirement for imputation whether the empirical world is deterministic, as Kant holds, or is 
                                                          
3
  I argue that Kant's rejection of Hume's inductivism allows Kant to endorse the 
possibility of single-instance deterministic laws, that is, causal laws which are 
instantiated just once, or which cover just one succession of events.  This in turn 
accommodates the possibility of types of events which occur just once, which may 
plausibly be found among the events of empirical psychology (MNS 471).  
Determination of once-instantiated laws would allow agents qua noumena to control their 
own phenomenal actions in a way that affords them alternative possibilities, without 
entailing control of events outside what we typically understand as the scope of our 
causal responsibility, such as events prior to our births.  Since causal laws establish the 
objective order of time, agents' determination of causal laws cannot be something that 
happens at a point in time, and is therefore 'timeless' and compatible with Kant's 
commitment to in-principle predictability of all actions.  See e.g. Benjamin Vilhauer, 
“Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist about Determinism and Moral 
Responsibility?” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12, no. 4 (2004), 719-30, 
and “The Scope of Responsibility in Kant’s Theory of Free Will,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 18, no. 1 (2010): 45-71.  For an interpretation on which 
transcendental freedom does not essentially involve the ability to do otherwise, see Derk 
Pereboom (2006) Kant on Transcendental Freedom, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 73 (3):537-567, p. 542-4. 
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indeterministic, since chance threatens imputation just as much as the deterministic subsumption 
of actions into a single series of nature.
4
   
Kant's consistency about the ontology of free will stands in sharp contrast to his 
inconsistency about its epistemology.  In the first Critique and the Groundwork, Kant holds that 
it is possible that we are transcendentally free, in a very thin sense of "possible"—that “nature at 
least does not conflict with causality through freedom”(A558/B586)—but that we cannot know 
that we are transcendentally free, and that for all we know, we are not transcendentally free.  I 
will refer to this view as “possibilism”.  Possibilism differs from the view Kant advocates in the 
second Critique and afterwards, where he appeals to the "ought implies can" principle to argue 
from the claim that we know we ought to act in certain ways to the claim that know we can act in 
those ways, which he claims to imply that we know we are transcendentally free (5:30).  Like 
many other commentators, I doubt the force of the second Critique argument in the context of 
the main themes of Kantian epistemology, built as they are around ignorance of noumena.  Kant 
himself argues, in the second Critique and afterwards, that there is a practical epistemology 
which gives us the knowledge not available through theoretical epistemology that we are 
transcendentally free.  I lack space to address this argument here, other than to mention that my 
skepticism about it is bound up with the concerns about the injustice of inadequately justified 
negative imputation explained in more detail below.  That is, I think that the burden of proof that 
must be met to justly impose the serious sorts of retributive harm Kant favors, such as executing 
murderers and enslaving thieves (MM 6:333), is simply too heavy to be met by his practical 
                                                          
 
4
  Kant recognized that indeterminism was a threat to freedom as well as determinism: he 
says that excepting a "being whose existence is determined in time" "from the law of 
natural necessity" would be "tantamount to handing it over to blind chance" (2C5:95).  
This point is also noted in Pereboom (2006) p. 541. 
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epistemology.  So, in what follows, I will for the most part assume that possibilism is the 
strongest view we can hold on the epistemology of transcendental freedom, and explore its 
implications.  
The Groundwork and the second Critique set out contradictory positions on the 
implications of possibilism.  In the Groundwork, Kant holds that possibilism is the only 
theoretical license we need to be justified in regarding and treating ourselves and others as free 
and morally responsible.  In the second Critique, on the other hand, Kant's implicit view is that 
we must know we are transcendentally free to have the needed justification.  To my knowledge, 
interpreters who wish to draw a consistent view out of Kant's texts have in the past chosen one of 
these views and rejected the other, or sought to interpret both in ways that eliminate the 
contradiction.  My view is that these positions are indeed contradictory as Kant sets them out, but 
that the best reconstruction preserves both by distinguishing the aspects of our moral ideas and 
practices for which each is true.  I think Kant is rightly sensitive to different demands of justice 
when he frames these different positions, but that he never combines them in a single account 
that is sensitive to all the demands of justice, and I will try to sketch how such an account might 
go here.   
I will call this the "justificatory asymmetry reconstruction".  It holds that in some but not 
all aspects of moral reasoning, we can justifiably appeal to claims about transcendental freedom 
even if we know only that it is possible that we are transcendentally free.  Examples include the 
provision of “cans” to support “oughts”, imputing merit, and drawing on the imputation of merit 
and the hope that we are transcendentally free to promote the development of rational nature in 
human beings.  But in other instances of moral reasoning, such as retributively justifying serious 
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harm, we cannot appeal to claims about transcendentally free unless we know that we are 
transcendentally free.
 5
  This calls for a non-retributive reconstruction of Kant's ethics. 
Kantian Ethics without "Oughts" ? 
 
Before I explore the justificatory asymmetry reconstruction, I first want to consider what 
possibilism would imply if the standard Kant implicitly sets out in the second Critique is correct.  
What if not knowing that we are transcendentally free implies that we are not justified in making 
any "ought"-claims at all?  If there were no "ought" claims there would be no categorical 
imperative, clearly, but there would also be no hypothetical imperatives.  That is, by Kant's 
lights, we would be deprived of the building blocks of not just moral reasoning, but all practical 
reasoning.   
We can look to a version of Hume's theory of agency for a fallback position for Kantians 
which may preserve worthwhile elements of Kantian moral rationalism.  Hume can be read as 
offering a model of practical reasoning that dispenses with "oughts".  It is widely agreed that 
Hume thinks reason does not tell us that we ought to pursue any ends, and that this on its own 
rules out categorical imperatives.  But Hume may also hold that even instrumental rationality 
does not involve ought-claims, when properly understood, and in Kant's terms, this would mean 
that there are no hypothetical imperatives either.
 6
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 My position is closely related to Derk Pereboom's position (Pereboom 2006) in that 
Pereboom also endorses possibilism and argues that it does not suffice for negative 
imputation.  I take myself to differ with him in my view that possibilism is adequate to 
provide a role for transcendental freedom in grounding "oughts" and positive imputation. 
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 For recent discussions about whether Hume thought there were "oughts" of instrumental 
reason, see Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason", The Journal of 
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On such an ought-eliminativist view, there are no "oughts" at all in practical reasoning.  
Instrumental reasoning is just a combination of theoretical reasoning about what is the case, and 
desires.  Successful instrumental reasoners are simply constituted in such a way that when they 
desire an end more than any competing end, and they theoretically reason that some means to 
that end is the most efficacious means over which they have power, then they acquire a desire for 
that means.  There is no role for a further claim that they ought to take the means to the end.   
However, ought-eliminativism does not imply Hume's broader view that reason has 
nothing to say about which ends are worth pursuing.  It would only imply this if it were the case 
that the only way we can reason about which ends are worth pursuing is in the form of "ought"-
claims.  A number of philosophers have argued that this is not the case.
 7
  We can find materials 
for an ought-eliminativist account of moral reasons in Kant's own texts.  That is, Kant claims that 
we can know what a perfectly good will would be like, and that there are no imperatives for a 
perfectly good will, since it necessarily wills morally.  This point is relevant for understanding 
not just the will of God, but also rational wills more generally: the " 'ought' [of the categorical 
imperative] is strictly speaking a 'will' that holds for every rational being under the condition that 
reason in him is practical without hindrance" (G 4:449).  For a perfectly good will, the moral law 
is a description of how it actually wills, not a claim about how it ought to will.  So Kantian  
moral reasons do not necessarily come in the form of "oughts".  It seems straightforward for 
ought-eliminativists to accommodate the idea of the perfectly good will, and to go on to give a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Philosophy 83, no.1 (1986): 5-25, and Elijah Millgram, "Was Hume a Humean?", Hume 
Studies 21 (1995): 75-93.  
 
7
 Derk Pereboom argues this in Living Without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 
143-148.  I make this case from a different perspective in "Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and 
Virtue Ethics" Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008, pp. 121-144. .   
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general account of successful moral reasoning on its basis which has the same sort of structure as 
the ought-eliminativist account of instrumental reasoning.  Ought-eliminativists who want to 
preserve the Kantian rational will could say that successful moral reasoners are simply 
constituted in such a way that, as a matter of fact, they will to act on universalizable maxims and 
to treat others as ends.  They could thereby avoid claiming that successful moral reasoners will 
as they ought to will.  It seems plausible that, despite our imperfections, we are all successful 
instrumental and moral reasoners some of the time, according to these definitions. 
But even though an ought-eliminativist account can achieve some of Kant's goals in 
building a rationalist ethics, it would frustrate many others.  Kant sees the claim that reason 
provides imperatives for our wills as essential for explaining how reason can direct imperfect 
wills like ours.  “Ought”-eliminativism can accommodate the idea that a perfectly rational will 
necessarily wills morally, but it has no way to offer direction to an imperfectly rational agent 
who, as it happens, does not will in a perfectly rational way, and does not want to do so.  Kant 
thinks imperatives play (at least) two roles in directing the will: they are commands that we give 
to ourselves as practical reasoners (4:413-4), and these self-commands play a role in generating 
motivation to conform to them.
8
  If I know I cannot do something, then it is practically irrational 
to command myself to do it, or to be motivated to do it.  A reconstruction that preserves 
imperatives and their roles in directing the will must find “cans” to support “oughts”.   
Possibilism and "Ought Implies Can" 
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 Kant may also hold that it is essential to imperative that if X ought to do A, then X’s failure to 
do A is imputable to X.  I do not think this follows, and if this is Kant’s view, it is not an aspect 
of his view that I wish to preserve in this reconstruction.  I think X is blameworthy for failing to 
A entails X ought to have done A, but I do not think the entailment holds in the other direction.   
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I think that possibilism provides strong enough “cans” to offer significant support for 
“oughts” in our practices of moral reasoning and action.  This claim is likely to provoke 
suspicion from two different directions—first, from commentators who agree with Kant’s second 
Critique view that we must have knowledge of transcendental freedom to have “cans” sufficient 
to support “oughts”, and that a view on which “cans” depend in any way on our ignorance about 
how things really stand with transcendental freedom must be too weak to help in our practices—
and second, from commentators who prefer reconstructions of Kant’s theory of freedom even 
more revisionary than the one I am proposing, which seek to eschew the difficult metaphysics of 
transcendental freedom altogether and to make do with deflationary, compatibilist-style “oughts” 
and “cans” that would available even if we knew both that determinism was true, and also that 
transcendental freedom was false.  I won’t try to argue that possibilism can support “cans” and 
“oughts” as strongly as the knowledge that we are transcendentally free would support them—
my more modest goal is just to show that the support it provides is practically significant.  I will 
explain and argue for this claim by contrasting possibilism with one such compatibilist, 
deflationary strategy, which I will call the “merely epistemic view”.  The “cans” and “oughts” 
provided by the merely epistemic view also depend on ignorance, but in a different way: on this 
view, what makes it consistent for us to believe that we can act in more than one way at any 
given time in the future is merely the fact that we typically cannot predict how we will actually 
act at that time.
9
 I will argue that possibilism provides better support for “oughts” and motivation 
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 Hilary Bok emphasizes this merely epistemic sense of possibility in the broadly Kantian 
account of agency she presents in Freedom and Responsibility, Princeton University 
Press, 1998, pp. 109-122.  I also discuss it in "Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously", 
The Philosophical Quarterly, October 2012, Vol. 62, No. 249, pp. 833–852. 
 
10 
 
in our practices than the merely epistemic view provides, because possibilism blocks 
retrospective falsification of “ought”-claims which the merely epistemic view cannot block.    
There is a broad consensus in favor of the view that deliberating about what to do at some 
point in the future is impossible without the belief that there are multiple things that I can do at 
that point.  This is part of what Kant has in mind in his Groundwork claim that "to every rational 
being having a will we must necessarily lend the idea of freedom also, under which alone he 
acts"(G:448).  But it is not obvious that the beliefs about “cans” necessary for deliberation 
commit us to any beliefs about the actuality, or even the possibility, of ontological alternatives of 
the sort that would be underwritten by transcendental freedom.  What is necessary for 
deliberation seems to be that I can act in multiple ways at a given future time to the best of my 
knowledge, and this merely requires my ignorance about what I will actually do—an ignorance 
which would almost always beset me even if I knew determinism was true and transcendental 
freedom was false, given my limited ability to predict my actions.  In other words, if I interpret 
"can" in this merely epistemic way, then even if I know that determinism is true and know 
(contra possibilism) that I am not transcendentally free, it is true that I can act in more than one 
way at any given time t in the future, so long as I do not know what I will actually do at t.  
Knowing the truth of determinism and the falsity of transcendental freedom implies that I have 
no ontological alternatives in the actual future, or said differently, that there is only one way in 
which it is ontologically possible for me to act in at any one point in the actual future.
10
  But the 
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 Hume’s compatibilism holds that we have ontological alternative possibilities even if 
determinism is true and we lack transcendental freedom—he argues in Section 8, part 1 of An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that even if determinism is true, "if we choose to 
remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may."  But Hume implicitly 
acknowledges that such alternatives are dependent upon something having been different about 
the past or the laws of nature (which on his view are not under our control) that would have 
caused us to act differently.  They are in this sense not alternatives in the actual future, and the 
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probability seems vanishingly small that we will ever be able to predict our actions in any detail, 
given the countless variables that would need measuring for prediction even given perfect 
knowledge of the laws of nature.  However, so long as I do not know what that one particular 
way will be, there are various merely epistemically possible ways in which I can act.   
This merely epistemic sense of "can" is sufficient to give us the logical space we need to 
accommodate the “commands of reason” essential to “ought”-claims.  Even an agent who 
believed herself to be deterministic and transcendentally unfree could contemplate merely 
epistemically open paths X and Y, deliberate about which one she ought to take, come to a 
conclusion, and command herself to conform to it.  If she is a psychologically normal agent, this 
command will have some motivational efficacy.   
Both possibilism and the merely epistemic view hold that “oughts” and “cans” are 
conditioned by our ignorance of how things actually are, but in different ways.  Both possibilism 
and the merely epistemic view hold that “oughts” and “cans” are compatible with (1) the truth of 
determinism, (2) the falsity of transcendental freedom, and (3) knowledge of the truth of 
determinism.  But only the merely epistemic view is compatible with (4) knowledge of the falsity 
of transcendental freedom.  On the merely epistemic view, it is the mere fact of my ignorance 
about how I will actually act (due to the limits of prediction) which creates the alternatives 
supporting “oughts”.  On possibilism, my ignorance derives not only from the limits of 
prediction (which obtains in any plausible theory of freedom) but also from noumenal ignorance: 
since it is possible that I am transcendentally free, it is possible that I have ontological 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
problem for advocates of this compatibilist "conditional analysis" of "can" is to explain how such 
alternatives are accessible to us in a way that would justify imputation.  For a reconstruction of 
Kant’s theory of freedom along these lines, see Hud Hudson, Kant's Compatibilism, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca: 1994, pp. 92-98.   
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alternatives.  In this way, possibilism offers a richer sense of an open future, and a past which is 
such that it is ontologically possible that I could have acted otherwise than I in fact acted.   
But does the difference in the ways possibilism and the merely epistemic view are 
conditioned by ignorance make a difference for our practices?  If the availability of the merely 
epistemic view means that “oughts” would be secure in our practices even if we knew we lacked 
transcendental freedom, then perhaps there is no reason aside from faithfulness to Kant’s texts to 
find a role for transcendental freedom in the preservation of imperatives, and to put up with the 
complicated metaphysics it brings with it.   
I think there are some cases in which the merely epistemic view is adequate in practice. 
Suppose Larry knows that determinism is true, and that if he turns a key, he frees an unjustly 
accused prisoner who is good by Kant's (or any other reasonable ethicist's) standards and is about 
to be painfully executed.  Nearly all Larry’s inclinations dispose him favorably toward turning 
the key, with the exception of a nagging desire to keep reading the book he will have to set down 
if he turns the key, which makes him hesitate.  He reflects for a moment, realizes that turning the 
key would be the just thing to do, and concludes that he ought to do it, and this gives him the 
additional nudge of motivation that he needs to put down the book and turn the key.  Is there any 
practical significance in a case like this whether we take the “ought” and its “can” to be merely 
epistemic, on the one hand, or possibilist, on the other?  Assuming that Larry had no way to 
predict that he would not turn the key, he had the logical space necessary to issue a command of 
reason to himself even if he believed himself to be transcendentally unfree, and his self-
command gave him the extra bit of motivation he needed to act.  So it seems to me that the 
merely epistemic view arguably provides us with everything we need for practical purposes in 
such a case.  
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 In other cases, however, possibilism offers resources that the merely epistemic account 
of “can” lacks.  An example can be found in famous second Critique case in which Kant 
imagines asking someone 
 
 whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of . . . immediate execution, that he give 
false testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy 
. . . he would consider it possible to overcome his love of life . . . He would 
perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit 
without hesitation that it would be possible for him.  He judges, therefore, that he 
can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom 
within him . . .  (2C 5:30) 
 
This is similar to the key case, in that Kant wants it to be clear that the normative question of 
whether one ought to resist giving false testimony is to be answered in the affirmative just as 
clearly as the question about whether to turn the key was.  But this agent's motivational struggle 
is more serious than the trivial one that made Larry hesitate.  Now, Kant's own point about this 
case is just that if I find myself in such a situation, then despite the motivational struggle, it is 
nonetheless clear that I ought to refuse to give false testimony, and this implies that I can refuse 
(at least according to his practical epistemology of transcendental freedom in the second 
Critique).  I want to adapt and expand on this case to argue that it points out a practically 
significant role for possibilism in supporting our motivation to conform to commands of reason, 
because of the way it blocks retrospective falsification of “ought”-claims.   
Kant's general account of motivational struggle involves a sort of force with which 
respect for the moral law suppresses (“humiliates”) the inclinations of self-conceit (see e.g. 5:72-
6).  It seems reasonable that the more confident I am in my belief that I ought to act in some way, 
the more effective this feeling will be in suppressing my inclinations of self-conceit.  Part of that 
confidence derives from confidence in my understanding of my obligations: do I really owe it to 
the person against whom I am asked to give false witness to refuse to act in this way?  Kant 
14 
 
thinks it clear that we should answer "yes".  Another part derives from the "ought implies can" 
principle: can I do the thing that I am commanding myself to do?  This question highlights a 
limitation in the merely epistemic account of "can".  If it is merely my ignorance of what will 
actually happen at time t that underwrites the alternatives at time t necessary to sustain 
deliberation and "can"-claims, then the corresponding "ought"-claims will often be falsified in 
retrospect, after I know what I actually do at time t.  Suppose that the prince has come to me 
seeking a false witness because I have always agreed to be a false witness before, but never 
without a motivational struggle between my belief that I ought to refuse and my inclinations.  On 
the merely epistemic account of "can", my previous failures to refuse imply that I was wrong, in 
those past cases, to believe that I ought to refuse.  That is, if what supports the "can" paired with 
"ought" in "I ought not bear false witness" is only my ignorance about whether I will bear false 
witness, then once I learn that I do in fact bear false witness, the "can" disappears, and with it, 
the "ought".  My past failure to be sufficiently motivated to act as I believed I ought to act 
retrospectively falsifies my past claims that I ought to act in that way.  This is unattractive both 
semantically and morally.  The fact of failing to act as I believe I ought to act does not seem like 
the right sort of fact to falsify the claim that I ought to act in that way.  It is also motivationally 
problematic—that is, human nature being what it is, if I know I was always wrong in the past to 
believe that I ought not give false witness, then it is natural for me to be less confident in the 
belief that I ought not give false witness now, and if that reduced confidence reduces the force of 
respect for law on my self-conceit, my motivation to act morally will be eroded. 
 If, however, we adopt possibilism, this restrospective falsification is avoided.  That is, if 
the sense of “can” at work incorporates the possibility that I am transcendentally free, and that I 
therefore may have been able to do otherwise at time t, then my knowledge that I did not do x at t 
15 
 
need not falsify the claim that I ought to have done x at t, because I can appeal to the possibility 
of a metaphysical mechanism that would have enabled me to act differently.  So failure to act as 
I believe I ought to act would not erode motivation in the same way.
11
 
It would of course be possible to preserve the merely epistemic account of "can" and 
avoid the retrospective falsification problem if we carefully time-indexed our ought-claims.  But 
I do not think that such time-indexing would do much to help with the motivational erosion 
problem for agents who were self-conscious about the semantic device they were employing, 
since time-indexing cannot really do anything to change the fact that, on the epistemic account, 
claims about what we ought to do are grounded only on our ignorance about what we actually 
do.  I do not think there is any way to avoid motivational erosion once we attend to that fact.  
This shows that possibilism is superior to the merely epistemic view in the support it offers for 
“oughts” in our practices.   
Some will no doubt object that what we really need to avoid motivational erosion is 
knowledge that we are transcendentally free.  There is no way to rule out the possibility that 
agents who take themselves to know that they have transcendental freedom will have stronger 
moral motivation than agents who merely believe that transcendental freedom is possible.  This 
is in significant part an empirical question, and I cannot address it here.  But it seems clear that 
possibilism offers practically significant advantages over reconstructions that dispense with 
transcendental freedom altogether, and that is all that I hope to establish here. 
Possibilism and Imputing Blame 
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 I discuss "oughts" and motivational erosion in more detail in Vilhauer 2008. 
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What epistemic standard would we have to meet to legitimately appeal to claims about 
transcendental freedom to retributively justify executing someone accused of murder?  Here, 
there is the obvious issue of assessing the accusation—did the accused actually commit the 
murder?—and there is a strong moral intuition that we must apply a very high justificatory 
standard in assessing such claims when serious punishment is at issue, which is manifested in the 
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard in criminal trials.  Derk Pereboom has argued that the same 
high justificatory standard should be applied to claims about free will because of the way they 
are applied in this context.
12
 Kant is also alert to this problem, since he claims in the first 
Critique that the unknowability of the intelligible character means that we can never impute 
actions with "complete justice" (A551/B579).  Further, in the Vigilantius Lectures on Ethics 
notes, we find Kant emphasizing a standard for the imputation of blame ("imputatio demeriti") 
which may be even higher than absence of reasonable doubt.  Imputation "presupposes that an 
action can be considered as a factum", which requires it to be "the effect of a causa libera qua 
talis", that is, "chosen with free will"(V27:561).  A judgement "whether somebody is declared to 
be auctor facti, must always, if it involves an imputatio demeriti, be based on certainty.  It is 
otherwise invalidum, the accused suffers injustice and is injured" (V27:564).  Later he describes 
this standard in more detail as the "utmost moral and logical certainty" (V27:566).   
By the time of the Vigilantius notes Kant has long since claimed in the second Critique to 
have discovered an argument that proves the reality of transcendental freedom in the "absolute 
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 Pereboom introduces the idea that the reasonable doubt standard is relevant for the 
metaphysics of moral responsibility into the contemporary free will literature.  See Living 
Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 161.  I also discuss this idea in 
“Free Will and Reasonable Doubt,” American Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2009): 
131-40, and the 2015 paper cited above. 
 
17 
 
sense in which speculative reason needed it”(CPrR 3), so he would by then have claimed there to 
be no metaphysical obstacle to meeting this standard.  In fact, already by the time of the 
Groundwork, when Kant continues to maintain possibilism, he appears to be moving away from 
his first Critique worry about justice in imputation.  In Kant's Groundwork exposition of the 
moral implications of possibilism he claims that since every rational being must act under the 
idea of freedom, "all laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his 
will had been validly pronounced free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy"(G 4:448).  
Since he states no exception for the laws connected with imputation, it is natural to assume that 
he means to include them.  But it seems clear that this does not follow—even if some beliefs 
about my own freedom or control are necessary when I deliberate about imputation, it does not 
follow that I must have those same beliefs with regard to the object of my deliberation.  Whether 
I am deliberating about imputing actions to myself or to another, I represent the agent as the 
object of my deliberation, and I have the conceptual space to refrain from regarding the agent as 
transcendentally free, and "refer" the action "only to the empirical character", that is, only to the 
deterministic phenomenon, which Kant himself claims to be required by justice in the 
A551/B579 passage just mentioned.  So the practical perspective on the question of 
transcendental freedom that Kant advocates in the Groundwork can easily accommodate 
skepticism about imputing blame when suitably reconstructed.
13
  Even if there is something 
correct about Kant's Doctrine of Right claim that "A person is a subject whose actions can be 
imputed to him" (MM 6:223), it is not clear why we would have to impute every action to a 
person – if there are reasons of justice to refrain from imputing blame in some cases, then the 
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 Evan Tiffany also makes this point in (2013) “Choosing Freedom: Basic Desert and the 
Standpoint of Blame”, Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-17. 
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practical perspective allows us the conceptual space to refrain from these imputations, and 
instead focus on the imputation of meritorious actions.   
If the only way to meet the standard for serious retributive harm is to know that we have 
transcendental freedom, then the standard Kant sets out in the Second Critique is the right one in 
this context.  Assuming the truth of possibilism, it cannot be met.  This means that Kant's 
preferred responses to criminals, such as the execution of murderers and the enslavement of 
thieves (MM 6:333), cannot be justified, and that imprisonment under torturous conditions like 
those that prevail in contemporary prisons cannot be justified.  
Retribution involving bodily injury and coercion is not the only sort of seriously harmful 
retribution relevant for Kant's ethics and contemporary practice: we use blame and guilt to inflict 
emotional retribution upon others, and also self-reactively upon ourselves through the pain of 
conscience.  I take this idea to be a part of what passes for everyday moral common sense in 
society, but it is also worked out in a descriptive model of conscience in Freud, and arguably as a 
normative model in Kant.
14
  At 6:394, Kant says that to experience "pain...from the pangs of 
conscience" is to "deservedly suffer…inner reproach".  He also argues that just courts apply the 
principle of retribution, and gives a detailed account of conscience as an inner court.  Emotional 
retribution can amount to harm just as serious as the harm of bodily torture; a sign of this is that 
both can prompt the desire to commit suicide.  Kant suggests at 6:485 that his moral theory does 
not encourage a debilitatingly painful conscience, but this remark is in tension with others.  For 
example, at 6:439, he claims that when conscience makes a negative judgment, it "pronounces 
the sentence of…misery, as the moral results of the deed".  To hold that we deserve to suffer 
misery as the moral result of evil deeds is arguably to retributively justify serious emotional 
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 See e.g. S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: Norton, 1989), pp 83-96. 
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harm.  Since Kant's own accounts of punishment and conscience cannot meet the epistemic 
standard we must apply here, both require repair, to which I will return below. 
Possibilism and Imputing Merit 
 
The justificatory asymmetry reconstruction holds that possibilism is adequate to support 
the role of transcendental freedom in positive imputation in at least some cases.  When we 
examine Kant's own approach to positive imputation, we find that Kant remains a kind of skeptic 
about positive imputation throughout the critical philosophy, even after he has rejected 
possibilism in favor of knowledge of transcendental freedom, and that he nonetheless gives 
positive imputation a central role in his moral theory.  For this reason, I think Kant's own view of 
positive imputation incorporates a low enough epistemic standard to allow the justificatory 
asymmetry reconstruction to leave it largely intact.   
Kant's main term for what we positively impute is "merit".  In the Doctrine of Right, Kant 
says that "If someone does more in the way of duty than he can be constrained by law to do, 
what he does is meritorious."  We act meritoriously in fulfilling duties of virtue—an example is 
when "at considerable self-sacrifice I rescue a complete stranger from great distress"(6:228) 
without, say, hoping for a reward.  But we can also act meritoriously in fulfilling mere duties of 
right: 
Although there is nothing meritorious in the conformity of one's actions with right 
(in being an honest human being), the conformity with right of one's maxims of 
such actions, as duties, that is respect for right, is meritorious... since another can 
indeed by his right require of me actions in accordance with the law, but not that 
the law be also my incentive to such actions.  (6:390-1) 
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Kant emphasizes in the second Critique that we are not morally worthy if we act in accordance 
with the law out of a desire to be meritorious, but we are nonetheless meritorious if we act in 
accordance with the law from duty (5:85).   
In the first Critique, Kant endorses a kind of skepticism about merit which is tightly 
bound up with skepticism about transcendental freedom: his concern that the unknowability of 
the intelligible character implies that we can never impute actions with "complete justice" 
extends to both "merit and guilt" (A551/B579).  In the Groundwork, where Kant argues that "all 
laws inseparably bound up with freedom hold" for us (G 4:448, quoted above), we might have 
expected merit skepticism to dissipate, but it does not: 
It is indeed sometimes the case that with the keenest self-examination we find 
nothing besides the moral ground of duty that could have been powerful enough 
to move us to this or that good action and to so great a sacrifice; but from this it 
cannot be inferred with certainty that no covert impulse of self-love…was not 
actually the real determining cause of the will; for we like to flatter ourselves by 
falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive…(G 4:407) 
In this passage merit skepticism seems to derive from the limits of our introspective insight into 
ourselves, rather than skepticism about transcendental freedom.  Since Kant still maintains 
possibilism in the Groundwork, it is natural to wonder whether doubts about the reality of 
transcendental freedom play an implicit role, but this seems to be ruled out by Kant's expression 
of the same thought in the Doctrine of Virtue:  
a human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite 
certain, in even a single action, of the purity of his moral intention…even when he 
has no doubt about the legality of the action.  Very often he mistakes his own 
weakness, which counsels him against the venture of a misdeed, for virtue.  
(6:392-3)      
This passage appears long after his rejection of possibilism, and this makes it clear that he thinks 
there are limits to introspection which ground merit skepticism and are independent of 
skepticism about transcendental freedom.   Kant clearly does not regard this skepticism as a 
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problem for drawing on the idea of merit in our practices.  (He does not disregard it altogether, of 
course—for example, it is a reason to avoid overestimating our worth and denying our 
continuing need for self-improvement.)  It seems clear that irrespective of how things stand with 
transcendental freedom, Kant thinks there are reasons to hold the imputation of merit to a lower 
epistemic standard than the imputation of blame.  I think this is because of his implicit 
recognition that the hazard of injustice present in holding imputations of blame to too low a 
standard is not present in the same way with imputing merit.  If people deserve the benefit of the 
doubt, then we do not have to be certain that they are meritorious to legitimately treat them as 
meritorious.  Because of this, it seems reasonable to suppose that his mature account of the 
imputation of merit should be able to tolerate possibilism about transcendental freedom 
alongside the merit skepticism based on limits to introspection which he explicitly 
acknowledges.  If Kant's account of imputing merit can tolerate possibilism, then the justificatory 
asymmetry reconstruction need not disturb it.  
My claim is not that there is no hazard of injustice in the context of imputing merit.  The 
degree to which merit can be imputed "has to be assessed by the magnitude of the obstacles that 
had to be overcome"(6:228), and we can never know "how many people who have lived long and 
guiltless lives may not be merely fortunate in having escaped so many temptations"(6:393).  We 
must therefore be alert to the risk of imputing merit to some in a way that unjustly excludes 
others.  But this can be avoided by (for example) singling out particular individuals for the 
imputation of merit privately, or striving to be egalitarian by imputing merit to everyone who has 
tried to act in a morally worthy way.  (It seems plausible to assume that everyone sometimes tries 
to act in a morally worthy way except psychopaths who lack the capacity to care about merit, and 
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it is hard to see how it could be unjust to exclude such individuals from the imputation of 
merit.)
15
 
If possibilism is adequate to support the role of transcendental freedom in imputing merit, 
then it seems reasonable to think that the justificatory asymmetry reconstruction can achieve a 
variety of Kant's other goals in his theory of freedom.  As mentioned earlier, Kant makes 
imputability an essential aspect of personhood in the Doctrine of Virtue, and his moral writings 
are full of remarks that connect regarding ourselves as transcendentally free with a special sense 
of dignity.  More broadly, Kant thinks that regarding ourselves as transcendentally free 
contributes to the development of rational nature in us in a wide variety of ways that I cannot 
adequately catalog here, which include disclosing a sublime moral vocation that is not confined 
by the limits of the empirical world, and supporting the beliefs that we can resist the impulses of 
the senses and that we are autonomous law-givers.  Cases like the key-turning case above raise 
questions about whether it is really necessary to regard ourselves as transcendentally free to see 
ourselves in these other ways.  But it does not strike me as implausible to speculate that it may be 
at least an empirical fact about human beings that regarding ourselves as having the sort of 
freedom that transcendental freedom would confer can help us to see ourselves in these other 
ways, and presumably we can use all the help we can get.  Why should it be necessary to draw 
on both positive and negative imputation to take advantage of this?  Suppose we have answered 
all the empirical questions about the contexts in which, drawing solely on positive imputation, 
we can promote the development of rational nature in human beings by regarding ourselves as 
transcendentally free.  Would not possibilism be a sufficient ground for regarding ourselves in 
this way, in these contexts? 
                                                          
15
 I discuss a parallel point in Vilhauer 2015. 
23 
 
Some may object that it would be irrational to regard ourselves as free unless we believed 
we were free, and the possibility that we are free does not justify the belief that we are free.  This 
objection is relevant for the justificatory asymmetry reconstruction's account of imputing praise 
as well as the account of the broader benefits of regarding ourselves as transcendentally free that 
I have just discussed.  But it oversimplifies the range of cognitive stances we can take toward 
representations of ourselves. I might have a reason to coach a basketball player to imagine 
herself as a bird if it helped her jump higher, and it would presumably not be necessary or 
helpful in this case to claim that it was possible that she actually was a bird.  But the cognitive 
stance toward transcendental freedom that best fits the justificatory asymmetry reconstruction's 
account of positive imputation is the hope that we are transcendentally free.  Rational agents can 
pretend or imagine that things they know to be false are true, but they cannot hope that things 
they know to be false are true.  The possibility of transcendental freedom would seem to be an 
adequate basis to strive to instill the hope that we are actually transcendentally free—it allows us 
to impute merit to agents not in the trivial spirit of encouraging them to pretend to themselves 
that they are meritorious, as a sort of internal emotional play-acting, but in a way that allows 
them to rationally hope that they are.   
Others may object that this approach to regarding-as-free is needlessly cautious. It may 
seem that even if I knew that transcendental freedom was impossible, I could still legitimately 
deceive people into believing that they are transcendentally free if I knew that it would 
contribute to the development of rational nature in them.  A view much like this is developed in 
intriguing detail by Saul Smilansky.
16
  But for Kantians, such deception should be recognized as 
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using the people deceived as mere means, even if it would benefit them—it would be a kind of 
epistemic paternalism.   
It may be that people naturally default to the belief in libertarian free will, so that 
philosophers would not need to actively deceive people to maintain broad social acceptance of 
the belief in free will.  Can Kantians simply acquiesce in people's maintenance of the false belief 
that they know they have libertarian free will?  Perhaps there are some cases where acquiescence 
would be permissible, though I am not sure.  But it is unsatisfactory as a general strategy, 
because people often appeal to unreflective libertarianism to defend retributivism, and 
philosophers ought to object to bad arguments used to justify harm. 
Kantian Ethics Without Retribution 
 
Serious retributive harm of both bodily and emotional kinds demands the second Critique 
epistemic standard of knowledge of free will, and given that it cannot be met, Kant cannot justify 
either of these.  Since Kant's own ethics depends on them, repair is required.  Optimistic 
anarchists might hope that rational nature is strong enough in us that society can hobble toward a 
condition of right even without the crutches of punishment and conscience.  While Kant may be 
too pessimistic in thinking we need to solve "the problem of organizing a nation…for a people 
comprised of devils"(8:366), I think it is imprudently utopian to do ethics without accounts of 
punishment and conscience.  So I think the best repair is to seek non-retributive Kantian accounts 
of punishment and conscience. 
Kant's texts offer resources here which have not yet been fully explored.  I advocate a 
non-retributive Kantian approach to punishment which derives from our perfect duty to avoid 
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treating others as mere means, and a non-retributive account of conscience based on a kind of 
remorse which derives from our imperfect duty to take others' permissible ends as our own.   
 Kant holds that the only alternative to retributively justifying punishment is to appeal to 
the good consequences of punishment for society, such as deterrence, which treats criminals as 
mere means to the end of a better-functioning society.  But Kant is mistaken here.  I advocate a 
non-retributive "ideal abolitionist" account of punishment inspired by Kant's first Critique 
skepticism about imputing blame, and his remark that in “a perfect state no punishments 
whatsoever would be required”, and that we must strive “to bring the legislative constitution of 
human beings ever nearer to [this] possible greatest perfection”(A316-7/B373-4).   
The idea is to select the principles of punishment in a version of Rawls' original position, 
and thereby draw on the idea of rational consent to punishment rather than retributive desert.
17
  
Suppose that we had to choose institutions of punishment behind the veil of ignorance, assuming 
that we had an equal chance of finding ourselves among the punished and among the 
unpunished.  Our first priority would be to make immediate progress with all means at our 
disposal toward a society that dispensed with institutions of punishment and emphasized non-
coercive preventative strategies to diminish incentives to commit crime, like better access to 
public services, jobs, education, and voluntary therapies for those most at risk of offending.  But 
while we work toward the ideal of abolishing punishment, it would be would be rational to 
maintain a scheme of reciprocal coercion which is currently our best hope for approximating a 
                                                          
 
17
 I discuss this approach in more detail in Benjamin Vilhauer, “Punishment, Persons, and 
Free Will Skepticism,” Philosophical Studies 62, no. 2 (Jan. 2013), 143-63, and in 
"Kant's Mature Theory of Punishment, and a First Critique Ideal Abolitionist 
Alternative", forthcoming in the Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. Matthew Altman.  Sharon 
Dolovich advocates a similar approach, but not in the context of Kant interpretation or 
free will skepticism (“Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy,” Buffalo Law 
Review 7, no. 2, 2004, pp. 314-29.)  
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condition of right, in order to avoid falling back into the state of nature (MM 6:221).  For 
example, it would be rational to choose to imprison violent criminals even knowing we might be 
among them, under the right conditions of imprisonment.  I think that to pass the rational consent 
test, these would have to be conditions that offered criminals more choiceworthy lives than the 
state of nature.  It may sound absurd to suppose that any conditions of imprisonment could pass 
this test, but from the Kantian perspective worthwhile freedom is not the “wild, lawless freedom” 
of the state of nature, but instead lawful freedom (MM 6:315).  From the perspective of right, 
worthwhile freedom is the freedom of acting without violating the limits of others’ rightful 
freedom.  Placing too much weight on this point would be totalitarian.  However, applied with 
humane caution, I think it is helpful.  It seems plausible that a radically reformed institution of 
imprisonment which provided meaningful opportunities for social interaction, work, education, 
voluntary therapy, and continual parole review could afford violent criminals more choiceworthy 
lives than they would have in the state of nature.  This approach to punishment can by no means 
justify the harsh measures which Kant himself prefers, but I think it hews closer to the dominant 
impulses of Kantian ethics.  That is, it follows Rawls in drawing on what I think is the core 
conception of the moral person in Kant's ethics, as the rationally autonomous legislator in the 
kingdom of ends.   
 The non-retributive Kantian account of remorse I advocate is loosely based on a 
rationalist analog of Hume's sympathy-based moral psychology.  The main idea is that there is a 
kind of remorse in which the wrongdoer suffers in sympathy with the pain he has caused the 
victim of his wrongdoing.  It is to be understood as having family resemblances to other kinds of 
sympathetic suffering, for example, the sympathetic suffering we feel for our friends and loved 
ones when they suffer.  The key point is that this kind of remorse is valuable not because it is 
27 
 
deserved, but because it shares in whatever makes these other kinds of sympathetic suffering 
valuable.  It is clear that the value of sympathetic suffering does not derive from its being 
deserved.  It would be absurd to think that by befriending or loving someone, I have gotten 
myself into a position such that I deserve to suffer when she does.  Its value has instead to do 
with the way it partially constitutes a valuable relationship.  It is not good merely because of its 
good consequences.  I don't deny that it is likely to have good consequences, since sympathetic 
suffering disposes us to relieve the suffering of the people with whom we sympathize.  It is 
natural to think that sympathetic remorse would not only prompt wrongdoers to try to restore 
their victims' well-being, but would also sensitize wrongdoers to the effects of their wrongs and 
prompt them to act better in the future.  However, for Kantians and non-consequentialists more 
broadly, it is important to be able to understand sympathetic suffering as intrinsically valuable.  
Its intrinsic value can be explained in terms of care ethics, or, for Kantians, in terms of the 
emotional conditions for the possibility of taking others' permissible ends as our own.
18
   
Kant's ethics can at first blush seem thoroughly hostile to any moral role for sympathetic 
engagement with others.  But further reflection shows something different.
19
  For Kant, having a 
permissible end implies having a particular determination of feelings which orients one 
conatively and emotionally toward that end.  So, to fulfill our imperfect duty to take others' 
permissible ends as our own, we must cultivate determinations of our feelings that correspond to 
determinations of others' feelings.  In other words, we cannot take others' permissible ends as our 
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own without sharing their feelings in important ways.  In this way sympathy can take on a role in 
Kantian ethics which parallels the role sympathy plays in Hume's ethics, though in Kantian 
philosophy the emotions involved are not metaethically foundational in the way they are in 
Hume's ethics—instead they are the emotional manifestations of rational relations among finite 
rational beings.  I read Kant as beginning to appreciate this in his later ethics, for example, in his 
discussion of active sympathy in MM 6:456, "Sympathetic Feeling is Generally a Duty".  I take 
this line of thought to show that we have moral reasons in some cases to be emotionally pained 
by the things that emotionally pain the people whose permissible ends we take as our own.  One 
implication of our finitude is that we lack the capacity to take all others' permissible ends as our 
own.  Partly for this reason, Kant accepts that "one human being is closer to me than another" 
(MM 6:451), for example, my parents, children, and friends.  How this point fits with 
universalizability is a complex question which I cannot address here, but it is clear that we have 
special reasons to take as our own the permissible ends of people close to us, and consequently to 
be pained by what pains them.  Kantians can hold that people we have wronged are similarly 
morally close to us—we ought to share in the suffering of people we have wronged in a way that 
parallels the way we ought to suffer in sympathy with our loved ones when they suffer, because 
it is the determination of feeling which expresses the rational relation of taking their ends as our 
own.  In this way, I think Kantians can have an appropriately rationalistic, non-retributive 
account of conscience. 
To conclude, I would like to have a try at a metaphor that both Derk Pereboom and Allen 
Wood have employed to illuminating effect.
20
  Wood thinks of Kant's effort to justify the 
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assumption that we are transcendentally free in doing ethics, despite our theoretical ignorance, as 
like the effort of a defense attorney to demonstrate that his client deserves the benefit of the 
doubt if we are not certain of his guilt.  Pereboom points out that Kant's willingness to appeal to 
transcendental freedom in his justification of the death penalty, despite our theoretical ignorance, 
is more akin to the attitude of a prosecuting attorney who would unjustly deny the accused the 
benefit of the doubt.  I think there is something apt about both these employments of the trial 
metaphor.  On my view, the standards that transcendental freedom must meet to play its roles in 
our moral notions and practices are asymmetrical, and they can be met in some cases but not in 
others.  So I think that transcendental freedom is the defendant in a number of cases before the 
bar, and that we should defend it in some of these cases, but prosecute it in others.  
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